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WORKING WITH RWANDA TOWARD THE
DOMESTIC PROSECUTION OF
GENOCIDE CRIMES
MAJOR PETER H. SENNETT, USMCR* AND LIEUTENANT COM-
MANDER GREGORY P. NOONE, JAGC, USN**
This paper reflects the views and opinions of the authors only and
is not intended to speak for the U. S. Marine Corps, the U. S. Navy,
or the Department of Defense.
This Commentary discusses the prosecution of the individuals
accused of the genocide crimes that occurred in Rwanda during
the summer of 1994.1 The primary focus of this Commentary will
be an analysis of the efforts of Rwanda's government to affect do-
mestic prosecution of genocide criminals, with some reference to
the work of the International Tribunal.2 Part I provides, as a
framework for our observations, a brief overview of the Interna-
tional Training Detachment (ITD) program in Rwanda. Part II
describes the goals of the ITD's latest trip, and examines the state
of affairs in Rwanda during that time. Part III discusses the ITD's
latest work regarding the domestic prosecution of genocide crimes
in Rwanda. Finally, Part IV assesses the merits of the ITD's work
* J.D., Syracuse University College of Law; M.P.A., Syracuse University Maxwell School
of Citizenship & Public Affairs; B.A., SUNY Buffalo. Major Sennett is an attorney with the
Law Office of R.J. Kasper, Jr. and Reserve Country Coordinator with International Train-
ing Detachment, Newport, RI. He served full time with the ITD from August 1994 - De-
cember 1996 and is the ITD team leader for all work done in Rwanda.
** J.D., Suffolk University School of Law; B.A. Villanova University. Lieutenant Com-
mander Noone is a Country Coordinator with the International Training Detachment,
Newport, RI.
1 See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7
DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 349, 353 (1997) (discussing overall destruction of Rwanda, as well
as destruction of judicial structures); Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal for
Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 177, 177 (1995) (estimating event resulted in loss of 500,000 lives and displacement of
half country's population) (citing Guy VASSALL-ADAMs, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL ACTION (1994)).
2 See Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. IN'L & COMP. L. 217, 221 (1995) (discussing effectiveness of
International Tribunal in prosecution of genocide crimes); Wang, supra note 1, at 218 (ad-
dressing effectiveness of new law concerning "crimes against humanity," as opposed to
"crimes of genocide").
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and remarks on future challenges that Rwandan prosecutors will
face.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING DETACHMENT
The International Training Detachment is a military organiza-
tion headquartered in Newport, Rhode Island.3 The ITD was cre-
ated in 1990 in response to a congressional mandate for a program
reflecting the United States' concern for human rights issues 4 in
the military context. Intending to focus on the military, the
United States State Department offered the administration of the
program to the Department of Defense. The United States Navy
took charge of the program and has been developing it ever since.5
The ITD began its work with four countries in 1991, and now is
engaged in working relationships with sixty-two countries around
the world.6 The ITD consists of a detachment staff made up of one
lawyer from each of the uniformed services and two civilians.'
There are also training teams, augmented with active duty and
reserve military members, who each meet the needs of the partic-
ular country the ITD may be visiting.
Initially, the ITD works with each country in three phases. The
first phase consists of a visit to a host country by a two member
team which meets with key members of the government and gath-
ers information to make an assessment of the needs of that na-
tion.' In the second phase, the host country sends a delegation of
3 See Bruce T. Smith, Uncle Sam's Newest Recruits: A Look at the Three JAG Schools,
Their Curricula, and Continuing Education Programs, 42-SEP FED. LAW. 22, 26 (1995)
(outlining various educational JAG programs currently in force).
4 See, e.g., Jill C. Stroguiludis, The Refugee Act of 1980: An Empty Promise to Exploited
Children, 29 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 995, 996 (1996) (explaining United States' concern for
protecting children abroad for human rights abuses); Jeffrey B. Whalen, Does The Law of
Human Rights Guide-Or Rationalize-United States Foreign Policy?, 79 AM. Soc'v INT'L
L. PROC. 18, 27 (1985) (arguing that inclusion of protection of human rights is fundamental
to foreign policy). See generally Dorothy Q. Thomas, Women's Human Rights: From Visibil-
ity to Accountability, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1995) (addressing increased recog-
nition of human rights violations in last decade).
5 See Smith, supra note 3, at 23 (noting Navy is manager for joint-service, congressio-
nally mandated Expanded International Military Education and Training Program, super-
vised by ITD).
6 See id. at 26 (stating faculty sent to teach United States Constitution, civilian control
of military, human rights, and American military justice in Ukraine, Romania, Czech Re-
public, Balkans, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Columbia, India, Surinam,
Chad and Poland).
7 See id. (explaining organization of ITD and make-up of its staff).




five to seven individuals to the United States for one week to sur-
vey pertinent institutions and discuss with United States person-
nel issues that are of importance to the delegation. During this
second phase, the delegates help develop a curriculum for a one
week seminar that the ITD team and host country's instructors
will conduct in the delegates' country. The third phase is a semi-
nar which is designed to reach an average of sixty participants.9
The seminar allows the host country's government to assemble a
formidable number of executive level administrators at one time.
The goal of the seminars were to implement the institutional
changes that the host government desired. After the first three
phases, each country developed its own pattern of involvement
with the Detachment. While some countries have scheduled mul-
tiple weeks of work in a fiscal year, others had maintained an an-
nual pattern. The maintenance of a working relationship with
each country was essential to the program and the ITD's efforts,
regardless of the frequency of the visits.
Despite being a military organization, the ITD sought and was
permitted to work with civilians in every country. Regarded as
essential to the success of the program, the ITD often brought ci-
vilians into the program despite the objections of some host coun-
try military members. 10 The Detachment attempted to involve
participants from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of each country to promote the broadest possible base from which
to implement desired changes." Typical goals of the programs
have been the implementation of a military justice system and the
establishment of a law of war training program, to promote the
military's protection of human rights.'2
In the spring of 1994, just weeks before the worst of the fighting
broke out in Rwanda, 13 the ITD completed the third phase of the
9 See id. (explaining that ITD provides broad range of seminars and programs focused on
rule of law and civilian control).
10 See id. (discussing how countries send their best attorneys to United States for im-
mersion in military legal system and American culture).
11 See id. (noting foreign governments send their most qualified attorneys to United
States for immersion into American governmental policies and cultural policies).
12 See generally id. at 25 (discussing goals and success of ITD in exporting American law
and culture).
13 See Robert C. Johansen, Reforming The United Nations to Eliminate War, 4 TRANs-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 455, 478 (1994) (arguing rapid deployment of international
forces to Rwanda in April of 1994 may have saved tens of thousands of lives); see also
Morris, supra note 1, at 350-51 (describing mass killings orchestrated by Rwandan govern-
ment to avoid broadening of power).
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initial program in that nation. Many participants had great hopes
for change,'1 4 in light of the fact that several Hutu and Tutsi lead-
ers attended the seminar and discussed their differences regard-
ing the future of the country. Unfortunately, that hope was mis-
placed and unimagined horrors followed. 15
II. ITD's PARTICIPATION IN THE AFFAIRS OF RWANDA
A. The Goals of the ITD Mission
The ITD returned to Rwanda in the spring of 1996, after the
country stabilized. 16 The country called upon the program to re-
establish ties with the Rwandan government and military person-
nel, who were tasked with prosecuting those individuals accused
of committing atrocities during the summer of 1994.1 The pro-
gram abandoned the initial request for it to work with military
members in developing a human rights training program when
the Rwandans were inundated with human rights training from
other sources.' To paraphrase one Army Major, the Rwandans
did not need to hear the definition of a war crime again; they knew
that crimes were committed. What they were interested in, how-
ever, was how to go about prosecuting people accused of the
crimes.
In light of this development, the ITD began providing a crash
course in how to conduct investigations. With only one week in
which to conduct its work, the ITD provided a general overview of
14 See Smith, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that military men and women involved take
with them superb legal expertise and sense of hope for people struggling to develop demo-
cratic legal system).
15 See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civili-
zation, 8 HRv. Hum. RTs. J. 229, 257 (1995) (noting that unspeakable horrors in Rwanda
were necessary to prompt ad hoc international tribunals); see also Fernando R. Teson, Col-
lective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 363 (1996) (explaining magni-
tude of human calamity occurring in Rwanda, constituting genocide).
16 See David Hollenbach, Report From Rwanda: An Interview with Augustin Karekezi (of
Rwanda's Jesuit Refugee Service), AMER. NEws, Dec. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8983613, at *4 (explaining that refugees were fearful of returning to Rwanda as stabiliza-
tion and new laws threaten judgment for genocide crimes).
17 See Wang, supra note 1, at 196-97 (discussing various problems of law requiring
Rwandan government to prosecute violators of humanitarian law).
18 See Anthony Goldman & Michela Wrong, Exodus Averts Disaster in Zaire, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13948808, at *4 (explaining that hundreds of agency
relief vehicles were on way to Rwanda, swamped with refugees); see also James C. McKin-
ley, Jr., 76,000 Await Trial in Rwanda Slayings, AUSTIN AMER.-STATESMAN, June 24, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 3434237, at *3-4 (explaining that United Nations has spent nearly




investigative procedure, stressing the relationship between the in-
vestigator and the prosecutor. 19 Though the majority of the par-
ticipants in this program were young and inexperienced, they
were motivated to learn and most benefited more from the week
than expected. Most beneficial to the participants were simple
checklists, which provided a flow chart of an investigation, that
ITD developed during the course of the week. Very simply, the
flow chart provided a methodology for dealing with the crime
scene. 20 That crime scene was most often described as the entire
city of Kigali, and almost as often, the country of Rwanda.
While the first seminar since the massacre was occurring, the
Rwandan government was debating the particulars of a new law
to address the events of 1990-1994.21 This law was the focus of the
ITD's second trip to Rwanda in September of 1996.22 The goal of
this two week mission was to review the newly-passed law, in co-
ordination with Mr. Gerald Gahima, the Deputy Minister of Jus-
tice,23 with investigators, prosecutors and judges, and to develop
an approach for its implementation. The ITD's general approach
was to review the provisions of the law, then come to a mutual
agreement as to the meaning and intent of each aspect of the law.
The second task was to apply the provisions of the law to a fact
pattern and conduct a moot court with the forty-five participants
of the seminar.
19 See generally Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do it, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?,
78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 558 (1990) (describing relationship between police and prosecutors in
United States); Rita M. Glavin, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Information for Lit-
erary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
1809, 1842-43 (1995) (describing interplay of prosecutors and investigators in criminal
process).
20 See generally Robert P. Spalding, Bloodstain Pattern Evidence and the Evaluation of
Violent Crime Scenes, 28-JUN PROSECUTOR 13, 16-17 (1994) (explaining how to evaluate,
collect evidence from, describe, photograph, and record details of crime scene).
21 See Chris Tomlinson, Rwanda Passes Genocide Bill, Assoc. PRESS (Aug. 10, 1996)
<http: I/www.reliefweb/intlemergenc/greatlak/sourceap/news100896.html> (noting that,
after months of debate, Rwandan lawmakers passed bill allowing for trials of eighty thou-
sand detainees accused of genocide).
22 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, United Nations Dept. of Humanitarian Af-
fairs (Sept. 1, 1996) <http'/www.reliefweb.int/emergenc/greatlak/sourceldha/rwamon
010996.html> (noting Rwandese National Assembly passed genocide bill on August 9,
1996, to prosecute persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and related of-
fenses committed between October 1990 and December 1994).
23 See id. (discussing Ministry of Justice's plan to conduct information campaign to ex-
plain new law to judicial and civilian authorities).
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B. September 1996: The State of Affairs in Rwanda
Rwandans estimate that their own countrymen slaughtered as
many as one million people.24 It appears that the actual count
ranges from five hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand, all
massacred in approximately ninety days with machetes and farm
tools. 25 Many publications explore how this massacre came to
pass; what follows is a condensation of several accounts.26
The history of Rwanda is straightforward, compared to many
other African nations. The Hutus and the Tutsis share the same
culture, language, and religious beliefs." They even shared the
same king (the Tutsi Mwami).28 Some historians argued that it
was inaccurate to call them different tribes.2 9 One may trace the
genesis of the most recent massacre back to the turn-of-the-cen-
tury, when the Germans took Rwanda as a colony.30 The Belgians
succeeded the Germans in 1916, by taking Rwanda with military
24 See Akhavan, supra note 15, at 328 (estimating one million of population of 7.5 million
slaughtered in less than three months); Morris, supra note 1, at 350 (estimating that from
April 6 to July 17 1994, between one half million and one million Rwandans were butch-
ered by their neighbors); John Robinson, Crime, Culpability, And Excuses, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (1996) (noting in spring of 1994 Hutu Rwandans slaughtered
eight hundred thousand Rwandans (citing ALAN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995)).
25 See GERALD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 264-65 (1995). The
estimated population of Rwanda in April of 1994 was 7,776,000, twelve percent, or 930,000,
of which were Tutsi. Id. at 264. Only approximately 130,000 Tutsi survived the massacre.
Id. at 265. The combined killing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu resulted in eleven percent of
the population being killed. Id.
26 See, e.g., Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participa-
tion in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 64-65 (1995) (discussing history of
tensions between Tutu and Hutsi Rwandans); William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy,
And Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7
CRIM. L.F. 523, 523-24 (1996) (addressing issues surrounding tensions and eventual mas-
sacres in Rwanda).
27 See Maguire, supra note 26, at 88-89 (explaining that Hutu and Tutsi share common
languages, religions, culture and history); see also Henry J. Robinson, III, "Failed States,"
Self-Determination, and Preventative Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Ex-
pectations, 10 TEMp. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 1, 16 (1996) (explaining that early in their history,
Hutu and Tutsi had peaceful relationship, "sharing language, religion and military alli-
ances"); Wang, supra note 1, at 179 (describing arrival of Tutsi in Rwanda and beginning of
sharing of culture and language of Hutu).
28 See Robinson, supra note 27, at 17 (noting Tutsi king consolidated authority through-
out Rwanda).
29 See DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 36 (noting that Hutu and Tutsi cannot correctly be
called ethnic groups).
30 See Maguire, supra note 26, at 54 (discussing arrival of Germans in Rwanda in 1892
and colonial rule from 1899-1916); see also Robinson, supra note 27, at 16-17 (explaining
colonial rule of Germans over Rwandans).
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force, and the League of Nations officially gave Belgium control of
Rwanda after Germany lost World War 1.31
Both the Germans and Belgians believed in a social theory pop-
ular in the early part of this century.32 Essentially, they believed
that one can tell a man's intelligence and abilities by sight.33 Typi-
cally the Tutsi people have lighter skin. They have small skulls,
thin lips and straight noses. 34 Some believe the Tutsi are descend-
ants of Noah himself, and that they are a dignified race of "white-
coloreds."35 By contrast, the Hutu people generally are short and
stocky.36 Their skin is very dark, and they have thick lips and flat
noses. 7 Thus, many considered the Hutus to be "sub-human" ne-
groes.38 The bottom line was that since the Tutsis looked more like
the European whites than the Hutus, it followed that the Tutsis
must be smarter. As a result, the European colonists educated the
Tutsis and placed them in administrative positions in the colonial
government.3 9 The Europeans left the Hutus to farm the land de-
spite the fact that the Tutsis owned most of the cattle.4 ° By the
end of the 1950's, the pseudo-ethnic division between the Hutus
and Tutsis became a real division under the policies and programs
of the Belgian colonial rulers.4 1 Both sides succumbed to fifty
years of theory and practice and the Hutu peasants grew resent-
ful.42 The Tutsis, the "superior race," grew arrogant.4 3
31 See generally PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 23-26 (describing arrival of Germans in
Rwanda and their rule until 1916 Belgian conquest and League of Nations Mandate of
1919).
32 See generally id. at 37-39 (discussing social theory of Belgians and its impact on
Rwandese society, as well as resulting racial prejudices).
33 See generally DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 38 (noting that German and Belgian colo-
nizers developed system of "tribes" based upon aesthetic impressions).
34 See id. at 39 (describing Tutsi as slim, with straight noses, high foreheads and thin
lips, who are distant, reserved, polite and refined in personality).
35 See id. at 38 (describing belief that Tutsi, or Hamites, descended from Noah).
36 See id. at 39 (describing how Hutu are assimilated to the Bantu, or "negroes," who
play role of serfs in society).
37 See id. (noting Hutu possess characteristics of negroes: flat noses, thick lips, low fore-
heads and brachycephalic skulls who, "like children," are "shy and lazy and usually dirty").
38 See id. (discussing role of Hutu as serfs in society).
39 See id. at 41 (noting that Belgians' main priority in Rwandan schools was educating
Tutsi students).
40 See id. at 39 (describing that, through customs of ubuhake, or right to own cattle,
transferred from father to son, assured Tutsi domination).
41 See id. at 40 (noting that Belgians purposefully promoted administrative reforms that
kept chiefdoms of Rwanda under Tutsi control).
42 See id. at 42 (discussing how Hutu developed own theory of "Ethiopian invaders," in
which they characterized Tutsi as colonizers along with Belgians).
43 See id. (noting that Tutsi succumb to, and sometimes backed, mono-ethnic theories of
origin).
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In 1926, the Belgians went so far as to issue identification cards
to all Rwandans. 4 On those cards, the Rwandans had to declare
whether they were Hutu or Tutsi, based on their father's ethnic-
ity, as there were, in fact, some "mixed" marriages.45 This declara-
tion cemented the Hutus' second-class citizenship. The declara-
tion became the death sentence for Tutsis who, nearly seventy
years later, were stopped at roadblocks and rounded up by the ex-
treme Hutus for slaughter.46
In 1959, a Hutu revolt led to the killing of twenty thousand
(mostly Tutsis) Rwandans 47 and a mass exodus of Tutsis to
Uganda, Burundi, and the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Re-
public of Conga).4' Around that time, the Belgians realized that
they had lost control of their colony and granted Rwanda its inde-
pendence. 49 From this point on, the Tutsis became the scapegoats
for any problems in Rwanda, as one does not easily forget decades
of oppression.50 While the Tutsi in Rwanda faced persecution, the
Tutsis in Burundi maintained their power, due to the strong con-
trol of the Burundi military.5' Thus began an interesting dichot-
omy in the fate of Hutus and Tutsis in the neighboring countries
of Rwanda and Burundi.
In 1963, the Rwandan Hutu government beat back a poorly
planned Tutsi attack on the Rwandan exiles in Burundi, leading
to the reprisal killings of an estimated ten thousand Tutsis in
Rwanda.52 From 1963 to 1973, Rwanda's President Kayibanda, a
Hutu, ruled the country much like the prior kings, requiring the
unquestioning obedience of the Rwandan people.53 This rule
44 See id. at 40 (describing policy of racial theory resulting in issuance of identification
cards to suppress Hutu).
45 See id. at 37 (discussing various classifications of ethnic groups, or "castes").
46 See id. at 45 (describing beginning of rising political tensions in early 1990).
47 See id. at 43 (discussing revolutionaries' call for the "return to Ethiopia of the Tutsi
colonisers").
48 See id. at 43-44 (describing turning point in Rwandan history as large number of Tutsi
exiled).
49 See id. at 44 (noting independence declared in 1962, and Hutu then monopolized
power); see also PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing formal declaration of
independence).
50 See generally DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 44 (discussing treatment of Tutsi in
Rwanda following declaration of Rwandan independence).
51 See generally id. (noting quota imposed on Tutsi who were allotted only ten percent of
places in schools, universities and civil service posts).
52 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 56 (feeling loss of control over situation, exiles invaded
Bugesera, but were beaten back and ten thousand Tutsi were slaughtered).




would later play an integral part in the 1994 genocide. When
President Kayibanda felt his power slipping in 1972, he attempted
to take advantage of the problems in Burundi.54 In that year, the
Burundi's Tutsi-dominated army killed nearly two hundred fifty
thousand Hutus.5 5 To maintain power, President Kayibanda tried
to stir up Hutu resentment of the Tutsis in Rwanda. Ultimately,
he failed and the Rwandan Army Major, General Habyarimana, a
fellow Hutu, overthrew Kayibanda in a bloodless coup.
5 6
The exiled Tutsis, and dissident and moderate Hutus, organized
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988.5' By 1990, the Hutus
had become more radical, as the RPF seriously challenged the
Hutus' monopoly of power. During 1990, the RPF attacked
Rwanda from Uganda, but the Rwandan army (known as the FAR
- Forces Armees Rwandaises) repelled the RPF with help from
French and Zairian troops.5" Following this conflict, the countries
signed a cease-fire agreement. 59 The agreement was largely inef-
fective, however, and, as a result, thousands of Tutsis died during
sporadic and scattered incidents between 1991 and 1993.60
The FAR then armed and trained ordinary peasants to become
civilian Hutu militias (or "Interahamwe" - "those who stand to-
gether"). 61 In 1992, the countries signed another cease-fire agree-
ment and negotiations began in Arusha, Tanzania between the
RPF and President Habyarimana's regime. 62 More killings oc-
54 See id. (noting President Kayibanda did not forget successful victory over Hutu exiles
when he tried to reproduce that victory in late 1972 into early 1973).
55 See generally id. at 60-61 (discussing President's various attempts to keep hold on
political power, as partial result of massive massacre of Hutu).
56 See id. at 60-61, 198 (describing bloodless coup of Major-General Juv6nal Haby-
arimana on July 5, 1973, resulting in widespread popular relief).
57 See id. at 72-73 (discussing formation of RPF, offensive organization dedicated to re-
turn of exiles); see also DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 79 (pinpointing creation of RPF as
occurring in 1988).
58 See DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 52-53 (discussing involvement of France in stopping
RPF's advances in 1992 and February of 1993).
59 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 91 (noting document drafted to allow Rwandan govern-
ment delegates to visit Uganda and select candidates for repatriation exercise by Novem-
ber of 1990).
60 See id. (fearing loss of support from refugees, Rwigyema, ex-commander in chief,
spread rumors as part of conspiracy of his own power, resulting in attacks and civil war).
61 See id. at 165 (discussing France's role in organizing notorious Interahamwe, respon-
sible for genocides of April and May of 1994).
62 See DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 80 (pinpointing signing of peace accords between RPF
and government on July 12, 1992).
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curred in Burundi during this period, however, causing thousands
of Burundi Hutus to flee to Rwanda in early 1993.63
In that year, the RPF again attacked the FAR, but with greater
success than before.64 Despite help from French troops, President
Habyarimana had to engage in negotiations.65 The Hutu-run gov-
ernment of Rwanda and the Tutsi RPF signed the Arusha Accords
in August of 1993, but they never really had a chance to imple-
ment its provisions.66 Although the parties intended the Arusha
Accords to provide peace for Rwanda and a sharing of power be-
tween the two factions, the existence of an integrated FAR and
RPF army, the RPF attacks, and the peace negotiation process,
led to the rise of Hutu extremists.
The assassination of Burundi's first freely-elected Hutu presi-
dent occurred in October of 1993.68 A moderate Hutu, the presi-
dent's death frustrated Burundi's Hutu radicals and Tutsi extrem-
ists alike. 69 His death set off massive killings of both Hutus and
Tutsis in wave after wave of retribution in Burundi.70 This upris-
ing, in turn, allowed the Hutu extremists in Rwanda to begin a
propaganda campaign against the Tutsis in Rwanda.71 On April 6,
1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundi's new Presi-
dent Ntariyamira were returning to Rwanda, after meeting with
other regional leaders.7 2 Those leaders had been pressuring Presi-
dent Habyarimana to implement the power-sharing Arusha Ac-
63 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 168-70, 173 (detailing various plans for widespread
genocide, and resulting killings, involving all factions, and subsequent flight from
Rwanda).
64 See id. at 174 (noting RPF launched successful attack on Byumba on February 8,
1993, causing FAR to withdraw in disarray).
65 See id. at 179 (discussing President's various discussions regarding situations, ulti-
mately resulting in condemnation of RPF and Uganda, and welcoming of French military
presence).
66 See id. at 191 (describing solemn peace ceremony in Arusha on August 4, 1993); see
also DESTEXHE, supra note 24, at 46 (noting Accords called for transitional government,
including RPF members and supervision by United Nations).
67 See generally PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 166-74 (detailing events making up rise of
extremism in Rwanda).
68 See id. at 199 (describing kidnapping of President Ndadaye by extremist Tutsi army
officers and murder at military camp).
69 See id. (noting boundless rage and frustration of Hutu over assassination of first Hutu
President).
70 See id. at 199 (detailing pogroms and killings of Tutsi and Hutu alike).
71 See id. at 200 (discussing call by CDR and allies for "final solution to the ethnic
problem").
72 See id. at 211 (noting Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam to meet President Ntary-
amira to discuss situation in Burundi).
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cords.73 Instead, two missiles took out the plane carrying the two
men as it approached Kigali Airport.74 In an ironic twist, the
plane crashed into the garden of President Habyarimana's own
home.75 It was believed, at first, that Tutsi rebels shot down the
plane.76 The prevailing belief today is that Hutu extremists, who
opposed the Arusha Accords, were responsible.7 7 The genocide
started within an hour of the plane crash.78
Working off "death lists," prepared long in advance by the Hutu
government, the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militia
went house-to-house and killed Tutsi men, women, and children.79
The militia also set up roadblocks around the country and de-
manded identification papers from all who tried to pass. 0 The
identification cards became death warrants. On the radio, the
main tool for communication in a country with a low literacy
rate"' announcers and soldiers urged. . . "[i]t is your civic duty to
kill the Tutsi cockroaches." They also exclaimed, "[k]ill the Tutsi
and your problems will be over;" "[clut down the tall trees," and;
"[tihe grave is only half full," referring to past Tutsi massacres.8 2
The peasants of the society, who the government had taught to
follow orders for centuries, did just that. This genocide lasted
three months.8 3
73 See id. (discussing reasons for meeting between political leaders).
74 See id. at 212 (describing firing of missiles and direct hit on Presidents' airplane); see
also U.N. SCOR, Oct. 1, 1994, para. 43, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994) (including letter from
Secretary-General to President of Security Council discussing airplane crash); Morris,
supra note 1, at 351 (describing airplane crash of Presidents and ensuing events).
75 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 212 (noting plane crashed into garden of Haby-
arimana's house).
76 See id. at 213 (explaining that there are no certainties as to who killed President and
detailing various theories).
77 See id. at 222-23 (discussing possibility that Hutu extremists were responsible for
killing).
78 See id. at 229 (describing immediate appearance of roadblocks and killings).
79 See id. at 231 (noting lists were long and detailed and targeted broad range of inno-
cent Tutsi).
80 See id. at 243 (describing setting up of roadblocks and house-to-house searches to kill
Tutsi); see also Interviews by authors with seminar participants, Rwanda (1996) (on file
with authors) (discussing aftermath of President's plane crash).
81 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 224 (discussing role of "Radio Television Libre des
Mille Collines," run by Hutu extremists, in encouraging killings).
82 See id. (discussing propaganda by media in encouraging massacres); see also Inter-
views by authors with seminar participants, supra note 80 (discussing messages dissemi-
nated by media that encouraged killings).
83 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 236-37 (noting massacres sweeping across country was
in fact genocide).
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Forty-eight hours after the Presidents' deaths, and the begin-
ning of the genocide, the RPF started an all-out war.8 4 Its ad-
vance, and eventual victory in July, saved the Tutsi people from
extinction. An estimated one million people exited Rwanda. 5 The
Hutu extremists (the Rwandan army and militia) fled to Zaire
with the innocent Hutu civilians and took charge of the refugee
camps.8 6 The new Tutsi-led government urged the refugees to
come home without reprisal, but the camps' rulers would not allow
such a result.8 7 In July, a cholera epidemic began killing
thousands of refugees, until international aide arrived. 8
The ITD received briefing reports, prior to leaving for Rwanda
in 1996, that read much like the newspapers. The military situa-
tion had stabilized, there were thousands in jail, and even more
refugees just beyond the boarders of the country.8 9 The reports
described the surroundings as devastated, destroyed, ruined, and
one was left imagining a wasteland populated by a dying people
who lacked the ability to carry on, without international aide.90
What the ITD found, however, was at odds with the media's por-
trayal of both the country and its people.
The support from the international community was improving
the situation." The Rwandans, however, were the ones making
the real effort to undo the damage that the fighting had brought,
and to bring stability back to the Country. The first thing that one
appreciated, having made multiple trips to Rwanda during this
period of reconstruction, was the continuing redevelopment of the
city. The Rwandans replaced street lights, resurrected traffic
signs, patched roads, and repaired buildings. All of this construc-
84 See id. at 268 (noting RPF started military operations again on April 8, 1994).
85 See generally id. at 265-68 (describing trauma suffered by large numbers of refugees).
86 See id. at 312-16 (estimating number of refugees from confusion of available
information).
87 See id. at 298-99 (discussing overwhelming confusion and complexities surrounding
large number of refugees).
88 See generally id. at 299-305 (detailing onset of cholera epidemic as new government
took over in July of 1994).
89 See id. at 298 (describing horrors as refugees had no other place to go but to line up
along roadsides); see also Teson, supra note 15, at 364 (describing conditions in refugee
camps).
90 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 299 (noting refugees lost all possessions, including
homes, in massacres).
91 See Akhavan, supra note 15, at 239-40 (noting various international efforts aimed at
training judicial personnel and developing judicial institutions); Jason A. Dzubow, The In-
ternational Response to the Civil War In Rwanda, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 513, 517-18 (1994)
(discussing role of international community in rebuilding Rwandan society).
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tion gave one the sense that the Rwandans were re-establishing a
sense of order, developments that were indicative of the processes
of a people seeking to re-establish a functioning government.
Just as the people suffered, most of the buildings that housed
the agencies and officers of the government also suffered damage,
if not complete destruction. From legislative offices to local magis-
trates' offices, the places where people went to create and enforce
the law were in shambles, with only the jails surviving.92 This
devastation of physical resources, and limited human resources,
severely impeded the enormous task of processing those accused
of crimes.
One accomplishment, however, was the passage of a long-de-
bated law that focused on the treatment of individuals accused of
participating in the massacre of 1994. 93 There were approximately
eighty thousand people in jail, held for allegedly committing these
crimes, when ITD arrived in Rwanda in September of 1996.94 The
government detained roughly eight-hundred more each week, five
hundred of which were later released.95 Thus, two years after the
genocide, the government detained approximately twelve hundred
new suspects each month.96 One prison official told ITD that,
short of committing murder, it was unlikely that the government
92 See Indictment of Eight in Rwanda Slaughter First Step for Tribunal, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Dec. 12, 1995, at C2 (discussing overpopulation of Rwanda's jails with people yet to be tried
by justice system for genocide crimes); Rwanda Kicks Out UN Troops, THE VOICE, Dec. 5,
1995 (noting swamped jails another factor in devastation to justice system in Rwanda). See
generally Ruth Wedgwood, Retaliation in Rwanda, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONrrOR, Dec. 20, 1995,
at 20 (explaining that there are no working courts or available judges in Rwanda, but
greatly overcrowded jails).
93 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, supra note 22. The law defines four catego-
ries of criminals: Category One includes four sub-parts: a) the planners, organizers, insti-
gators, and leaders of the genocide; b) persons in position of authority - political, religious
or military - who perpetrated or fostered such crimes; c) notorious murderers who acted
with zeal or excessive malice, and; d) those who committed acts of sexual torture (while
there was no precise definition of the term "sexual torture," common law rape is included in
the offense). Id. Category Two contains perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of inten-
tional homicide or of serious assaults causing death. Id. Category Three includes persons
whose acts or participation make them guilty of serious assaults (but not resulting in
death). Id. Category Four includes persons who committed offenses against property, or
looters. Id.
94 Interviews by authors with personnel of United States Embassy and Staff Members of
International Committee of Red Cross, Kigali (Sept., 1996) (on file with authors) (discuss-
ing enormous problems resulting from jails being overcrowded with individuals accused of
genocide crimes). See Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of
Prosecuting Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflicts, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
Rzv. 629, 646-48 n.89 (1996) (noting severe overcrowding in prisons and unhealthy
conditions).
95 See id. (discussing government detention of individuals accused of genocide crimes).
96 See id. (describing imprisonment of individuals accused of genocide crimes).
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would arrest individuals in Rwanda simply because there is no
place to put the accused.9 7 A visit to the Kigali prison proved this
to be true. The prison revealed wall-to-wall people, with the pris-
oner hierarchy determined by those who had to stand, those who
could sit, those who could lie down, and those who could lie down
in the shade.
In light of these statistics, the Rwandans were, and still are,
under constant pressure to address the issue of processing the ac-
cused.98 The new law, designed to allow the few legal profession-
als that remained in the country to perform what can only be
characterized as a daunting task, was a vehicle to accomplish this
processing. 99 It was no small feat that the government passed the
law. Distinct factions in the Rwandan government were at odds
over the sweeping reforms that came with the new law.'00 Central
to the arguments, though, was the guilty plea provision of the ge-
nocide law.1 1
The guilty plea was not previously part of the Rwandan system,
as it had not been part of the Belgian legal system. Most of the
seminar participants simply did not appreciate a concept that
many take for granted as a method to promote both efficient use of
legal resources and responsibility for one's actions. Because of
their lack of familiarity with the notion, the philosophical ques-
tions regarding the propriety of the new law consumed the partici-
pants, preventing their coming to terms with application of the
law. In addition, for those who did focus on the application of the
new law, their lack of appreciation for the need to achieve a cer-
97 Interview by authors with Rwandan prison official, Rwanda (Sept. 1996) (on file with
authors) (discussing that prisons were so overcrowded in Rwanda that persons committing
lesser crimes were not arrested for lack of space). See Akhavan, supra note 15, at 348 (dis-
cussing prison population as major source of human rights violations).
98 See Eric L. Chase, To Punish and Deter Grievous Misconduct in War, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1995, at C7 (discussing difficulties surrounding international involvement in war
crime prosecution); Rwanda's Refugees, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1995, at A18 (discussing inter-
national community's interest in prosecuting genocide crimes in devasted country
swamped with refugees).
99 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, supra note 22 (setting forth definitions of
genocide crimes, and various penalties for those crimes, as described in law).
100 See Rupa Bhattacharyya, Establishing A Rule-Of-Law International Criminal Jus-
tice System, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 57, 62 n.23 (1996) (explaining Rwandan government's re-
quest for creation of international tribunal); see also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1600, 1601 (1994) (establishing interna-
tional tribunal for prosecution of genocide crimes).
101 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, supra note 22 (noting plea bargaining ar-




tain level of efficiency in the administration of justice confounded
them to a certain extent. This problem, of course, stemmed from
the simple fact that a crowded docket, let alone a completely over-
whelmed one, had never existed in Rwanda.
III. THE ITD PROGRAM
Based on the above circumstances, the ITD sought to accom-
plish three goals, in ascending order of importance: 1) Providing
the seminar participants with a basic framework for the criminal
justice process, from an investigation through prosecution; 2) dis-
seminating, reviewing, and coming to an agreement over the sub-
stance of the new law, and; 3) conducting a moot court, to imple-
ment the new law in the manner that was agreed upon. While
ITD did manage to accomplish its tasks, there were as many new
questions requiring answers on the final day of the seminar as
there were on the day of ITD's arrival.
ITD began its program with an overview of the criminal justice
system for three reasons. First, the staff needed a better under-
standing of the people that ITD was working with. Their back-
ground, experience, and propensity to interact were all unknown.
From experience, the average European-educated audience gener-
ally takes at least two days to warm-up to an American style of
teaching. Second, the staff had to overcome such obstacles as the
reluctance for disagreement and discussion amongst participants,
and the contradiction of speakers, before participants could learn
about the realities of the Rwandan legal system and what is re-
quired for a just trial of an individual. 10 2 There was very little in-
formation available to the staff in the English language about the
Rwandan or Belgium legal systems. While there was more avail-
able information concerning the French and European criminal
justice systems,' 013 that information was hardly adequate for
102 See generally Philip Gourevitch, Letter from Rwanda After the Genocide, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 78, 88 (describing Westerners' knowledge and understanding of
workings of Rwandan government as suspect).
103 See, e.g., Stewart Field & Andrew West, A Tale of Two Reforms: French Defense
Rights and Police Powers in Transition, 6 CRIM. L.F. 473, 489-90 (1995) (discussing possible
reforms of French criminal justice system); Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right
to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMi-
NOLOGY 402, 418 (1994) (discussing dominance of common law courts in English justice
system); Jeffrey K Walker, A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 20 (1993) (comparing right of self-incrimina-
tion in French and English criminal justice systems).
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working with prosecutors and judges in implementing the new
law under the Rwandan system. Third, an overview of the justice
system served to provide basic information about the law. As with
the investigators the ITD worked with in July, checklists were
popular items for all the participants. The trial notebook, witness
interview, and courtroom security checklists all were necessary
guideposts for the inexperienced, and the overview portion of the
seminar addressed the basics in a short period of time.
The second critical element of our program was an official publi-
cation containing the new law. ' 0 4 Not only was it crucial that each
person possess the text of the law, it was important that the publi-
cation be the official publication of the government printing office.
Rwanda has three official languages: French, English and Kiny-
arwandan. 10 5 The government publication contains translations of
the law in all three languages, allowing for easy comparison of
terms that may carry slightly different implications in each lan-
guage. 10 6 The fact that most participants had a command of two of
the three languages further complicated arguments over the text.
Fortunately, an educated and opinionated translator was able to
keep most disputes short, with both his command of the languages
and ability to tell the participants that, simply put, they were
wrong.
Providing the official version of the law to the participants also
leveled, what some would confide to the staff, was not an even
playing field. One participant told a staff member that the judges
did not trust the prosecutors, who did not trust the investigators,
who did not trust anyone. To a small extent, this was apparent in
our seminar, as the participants often posed questions regarding
groups of persons who would handle certain substantive matters,
rather than posing questions as to the particular subject. For ex-
ample, rather than pose a question about the extent of investiga-
tion necessary to prepare a case for trial, prosecutors questioned
why investigators "would not do their job completely." The an-
swer in most cases, unfortunately, was simply that the investiga-
104 See ORGANIC LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES CONSTITUT-
ING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITrED SINCE 1 OCTOBER
1990 [hereinafter ORGANIC LAwI (on file with authors).
105 See PRUNIER, supra note 25, at 343-44 (explaining problems of language barriers be-
tween those speaking French, Swahili and Kinyarwandan).
106 See ORGANIC LAw, supra note 104.
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tors did not know how to do their job.10 7 Most were young and
inexperienced, and lacked guidance from seasoned professionals
in what were less than ideal conditions for learning the trade.
Even for those few who did have some investigative pre-war expe-
rience in Rwanda, or the neighboring countries where they spent
their exiles, investigators lacked the resources to proceed past the
most basic steps of the investigative process, such as asking ques-
tions and writing answers. Most Rwandan investigators lacked
forensic labs, recording equipment, video tape recorders, and cam-
eras; they did not even have enough vehicles to travel the roads in
search of witnesses. 0 8
The participants countered these questions with retorts imply-
ing that, no matter how complete the investigation, prosecutors
would not go forward with a case. The sources of reluctance to
take cases to trial varied from fear that an inexperienced prosecu-
tor's first case might be a genocide trial in Rwanda, to fear that his
first case would be his last, due to the Hutu rebel forces' threats of
retribution from just beyond Rwanda's borders. 10 9 The investiga-
tors who spoke out, however, overlooked a more significant factor.
The government only passed the law for prosecution of the massa-
cre's accused participants one week before ITD's arrival. 10
The international community that descended upon Rwanda to
rebuild the country after the massacre contributed in many ways
to the nation's legal and political infrastructure."' Experts from
every walk of life have provided input to the Rwandans." 2 The
107 See generally Spalding, supra note 20, at 16-17 (explaining how to evaluate, collect
evidence from, describe, photograph, and record details of crime scene).
108 See Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 114-15
(1997) (discussing numerous obstacles facing investigators of human rights crimes); Mor-
ris, supra note 1, at 352 (explaining destruction of Rwanda and resources necessary to run
legal system).
109 Alan Zarembo, Rwanda's Genocide Witnesses are Killed as Wheels of Justice Slowly
Begin Turning: More than 200 Rwandan Genocide Survivors Were Killed Last Year Before
They Could Testify in Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1997, at 7 (describing fears
of witnesses in testifying because of threats of, and actual, killings to ensure their silence).
110 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, supra note 22 (stating Rwandese genocide
bill passed August 9, 1996).
111 See Cisse, supra note 108, at 104 (criticizing responses of international community to
Rwanda's problems); Peter Rosenblum, Save The Tribunals: Salvage the Movement, a Re-
sponse to Makau Mutua, 11 TEMP. IN 'L & CoMP. L.J. 189, 191 (1997) (discussing involve-
ment of international community in genocide crimes in Rwanda); Wang, supra note 1, at
188 (questioning whether involvement of international community can help situation in
Rwanda).
112 See, e.g., Sheila O'Shea, Interaction Between International Criminal Tribunals and
National Legal Systems, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 367, 404 (1996) (discussing establish-
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international community, however, has not provided the means
for Rwandans to help themselves. If Rwanda were the home of
the Peanuts, Lucy would offer five cent advice at stands on every
corner. But there is no one to get in the trenches and work with
Rwandans to actually get things done on a daily basis. The staff
encountered few individuals who worked hand-in-hand with the
Rwandan on specific tasks. Whether it was interrogating suspects
or interviewing witnesses, most Rwandans were left to their own
devices. Some argue that doing more than advising is interfering.
The staff, however, did not get the impression that assistance on
actual cases-to demonstrate investigative, prosecutorial, or de-
fensive techniques-would be shunned. The participants went to
great lengths to impart the reality of the environment in which
they were working. They devoted a great deal of time to listening
to the Rwandan's concerns over their safety in the justice system,
and the obstacles they faced in obtaining information or coopera-
tion from witnesses. 113 These factors showed that, for the program
to have any chance at making a significant impact, the staff
should focus on doing, rather than telling.
Thus, the staff limited the discussion of the new law, an eleven
page document, to two full days. While the participants had ideas
about how the government should implement the law, based on
discussions with several individuals who helped to draft the law,
the staff felt that the Rwandan Ministry of Justice should address
the most significant questions regarding each section of the law.
The staff collected unresolved questions at the close of each day
and delivered them to the Ministry of Justice. Then, a Ministry
official would address each point the following morning. It was
important for the participants to hear Rwandans telling their
countrymen what their law means, rather than well-intentioned
members of the international community telling Rwandans what
the law should, or ought, to mean.
ment of Commission of Experts in 1994 to analyze violation of humanitarian law); Panel
III: Identifying And Prosecuting War Crimes: Two Case Studies-The Former Yugoslavia
And Rwanda, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 631, 660 (1996) (explaining input of 150 people
from European Union in domestic judicial system); Virgil Wiebe, The Prevention of Civil
War Through the Use of the Human Rights System, 27 N.Y.U. J. N'L L. & POL. 409, 465
(1995) (explaining that special human rights monitors were sent to Rwanda to investigate
war crimes in 1994).




The majority of questions focused on provisions concerning the
guilty plea, a completely novel concept for the Rwandans. 114 Most
troubling was that portion of the law that required a complete con-
fession before one could qualify for a sentence reduction. 1 15 Indi-
viduals who implicate themselves in additional crimes while
pleading guilty cannot obtain sentence reductions, even if the ad-
ditional crime divulged is less serious and does not impact the
maximum sentence of the crime they originally confessed to." 6
This fact, combined with internal motivations and constant exter-
nal pressures for prosecutors to seek the severest of punishments,
lead to guilty plea interrogations (or providence inquiries) that
were almost as lengthy as full-blown trials. Basic unfamiliarity
with the guilty plea, and how it aids the justice system, further
confounded the issue. Because passions over the massacre run so
deep, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the prosecutors to assess
the big picture and pursue justice on a grand scale. Rather, prose-
cutors face each case with equal intensity, pursuing the small fish
with the same vengeance as the big.
It was at this impasse that the staff turned to the third prong of
the seminar: The moot court. Because experience had shown the
staff that more often than not the majority of seminar time is
wasted as participants argue over facts, the basis for the hypo-
thetical problem was not an actual Rwandan case. Rather, the
staff used a fact pattern based upon actual incidents that occurred
in Bosnia" 7 and based the problem in fictitious Blueland. The
fact pattern, however, was disturbingly similar, and certainly ap-
plicable, to an earlier visit to a massacre site in Kongoro. In
Rwanda, as in Bosnia, the killings were not the product of a spon-
taneous uprising, but of calculated efforts to exterminate the pop-
114 See Rwanda Monthly Information Report, supra note 22 (describing plea bargaining
arrangement available in certain cases to secure lesser penalties).
115 See Rwandan Genocide Trials, AfR. NEWS SERV., Feb. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8819305 (explaining that defendant who wishes to plead guilty must describe all offenses
committed including date, time and scene of each act, and names of known victims and
witnesses, as well as any other information that aids prosecution).
116 See ORGANIc LAw, supra note 104.
117 See generally Jordan J. Paust, Peace-Making And Security Council Powers: Bosnia-
Herzegovina Raises International and Constitutional Questions, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 131, 131-
33 (1994) (explaining history of genocide crimes in Bosnia); Nicole M. Procida, Ethnic
Cleansing In Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Case Study: Employing United Nation Mechanisms to
Enforce the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18
SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REv. 655, 669-70 (1995) (discussing war in Bosnia and explaining
history behind it).
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ulation. 11" At the Rwandan massacre site the dormitory rooms of
a former vocational school were filled with bodies exhumed from
the mass graves surrounding the school. Many of the rooms in the
administration building were used as holding cells for the locals
who were instructed to gather there to find refuge from the
fighting.19
The hypothetical problem used at the seminar included several
witnesses and limited physical evidence, as well as information
regarding the bodies and grave sites. Participants had the oppor-
tunity to question the witnesses and the accused. After a discus-
sion of the facts and techniques utilized, the staff gave each par-
ticipant "official" statements of the facts for the sake of uniformity.
These statements became the foundation for charging, and subse-
quently conducting, a guilty plea for the accused.
The guilty plea did not proceed with the expediency that the
drafters had hoped for. To maintain some control over the exer-
cise, one of the teaching team members acted as a judge, and other
instructors played the witnesses and the accused. While the staff
attempted to keep the process moving by calling attention to re-
dundancies in questioning the majority usually found merit in a
colleague's question, compelling the instructors to address the is-
sue. The preliminary questioning to establish the accused's iden-
tity also lasted longer than one would expect. Watching this pro-
cess unfold, however, the staff began to believe that a lack of trust
118 See Alan C. Laifer, Never Again? The "Concentration Camps" in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEw EuR. L. REv. 159, 186-87 (1994) (discuss-
ing extermination of citizens in Bosnia); see, e.g., Elizabeth F. Schwartz, Getting Away With
Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia and the Role of the United States, 27 U. MIAii IN-
TER-AM. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (1995-96) (using Bosnia as recent example of ethnic cleansing).
119 We visited Murambi, (out by Gikongoro) the site of a well known Tutsi massacre,
with Major Richard Sesibera, now a member of the National Assembly, who provided us
with the details of what transpired there. The Hutus rounded up thousands of Tutsis (and
any moderate Hutus that were against the killing) and brought them to a vocational school
in the countryside in April 1994. We were given various figures as to the number killed at
this site: some stated 26,000 were killed here, others estimated 7,000 or 8,000, but the
exhumation was not complete. All of the dead were deposited in mass graves after being
killed by clubbing, beheading, or shooting. Many were simply buried alive. The current
government has exhumed all of the bodies it could find at this site and others because, we
were told, much like with the Holocaust, people began saying the killings did not actually
happen. In light of this, the government laid out the dead in each of the school's dormitory
rooms (there are twelve dorm buildings with six rooms in each and all of the buildings are
completely filled). The bodies and various recovered body parts were covered in time in
order to preserve them. The sight, and more particularly the smell, of the thousands of




pervaded the justice system. The interrogator did not necessarily
doubt the accused's credibility, but lacked faith in the system.
The guilty plea broke down when the accused improvidently
mentioned a crime that was not contained in the written confes-
sion before the court. Although the accused mentioned a lesser
crime that would not affect the maximum sentence, 120 the major-
ity of the participants believed that the accused's failure to dis-
close knowledge of all crimes, as the law required, warranted de-
nying the accused the benefit of the guilty plea and compelling a
full trial. One should bear in mind that in this case, the accused
did not commit another crime, but merely had knowledge of one.
Thus, literal interpretation of the law prevented the process to
move forward as intended. The participants, however, did arrive
at a sentence by the end of the day. Surprisingly, after such an
intense process of questioning, and arguments over the minutiae
of the case, the accused did not receive the maximum sentence.
The development highlighted a theme that surfaced in various
forms during the seminar-the fairness of the law.
Many participants deemed the genocide law unfair with regard
to the families of the victims because the law allows for limita-
tions on harsh sentences that normally accompany similar con-
duct under Rwandan law;' 2 ' with regard to the accused because it
does not compel the government to prove its case; and with regard
to the government because the law would prevent effective ferret-
ing out of those individuals taking advantage of the guilty plea
process to avoid a trial. However, these issues were addressed by
the National Assembly and they passed into law. Whether or not
those charged with carrying out the law will appreciate that fact is
questionable.
IV. THE FUTURE
The Rwandans began prosecuting cases on December 27,
1996.12 As of February, 1997, there were eleven death sentences,
sixteen life imprisonments, and one acquittal.' 2 3 It does not
120 See ORGANIC LAW, supra note 104.
121 See Tomlinson, supra note 21 (noting that many genocide survivors find Rwandan
genocide law to be too lenient).
122 See Rwandan Genocide Trials, supra note 115 (discussing beginning of prosecution of
genocide crimes in Rwanda).
123 See id. (explaining progress and status of pending prosecutions of genocide crimes).
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trouble Rwandans that there is a lack of defense counsel, as it
might trouble Western observers, because such a situation is "in
line with the Rwandan legal tradition." 24 Additionally, the lack of
trained personnel to make the system work is an impediment that
requires some deviations from the standards that the West is im-
posing upon the Rwandans. 125 In some cases, at the Rwandan gov-
ernment's invitation, the organization "Avocats Sans Frontieres"
(Lawyers Without Borders) has provided defense counsel. 126 The
guilty plea process, however, has yet to expedite the process, pri-
marily because few accuseds have pleaded guilty. In two cases,
the courts rejected the pleas because the accuseds failed to name
accomplices.' 27 Compounding these difficulties is the fact that wit-
nesses, and even judges, are being killed. 28 The process may con-
tinue at its current pace for anywhere from ten to forty years.
Just based upon the two thousand estimated cases of crimes
against humanity, the prosecutions will take over four years, at a
rate of one case per day.1 29
The most often discussed alternative to prosecution under the
new law is a general amnesty that would permit the release of
thousands of prisoners currently jailed for lesser offenses.' 30 The
likelihood of such a development any time soon, however, is virtu-
ally nil. In anticipation, though, one should note that the
Rwandans have been working with the South Africans to learn
more about South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
124 See Roland Siegloff, Rwanda's Legal System Facing Paralysis Over Backlog of Geno-
cide, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 7, 1997, at 4 (discussing that Rwandan justice sys-
tem will be threatened for years to come).
125 See Stephen Buckley, Justice, Too, on Trial in Genocide Courts; Different Problems/
Rwanda and UN Tribunals Hampered, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 31, 1997 (noting that
while there are approximately two hundred lawyers in Rwanda, only sixteen are practic-
ing, and most refuse to represent genocide suspects).
126 See Michael G. Karnavas, Rwanda's Quest For Justice: National and International
Efforts and Challenges, 21-MAY CHAMPION 16, 57 (1994) (discussing work of Advocats Sans
Frontieres in Rwanda).
127 See Matthew Tostevin, Rwanda Says it Expects Genocide Trials to Pick Up, REUTERS
NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Feb. 27, 1997 (discussing guilty plea and large amount of cases
awaiting trial).
128 See Zarembo, supra note 109, at 7 (discussing reluctance of witnesses to testify, as
many witnesses were killed prior to trial to maintain their silence).
129 See Tostevin, supra note 127 (explaining that International Tribunal struggling to
move cases along, but its efforts have been "useless").
130 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 235-36 (discussing possibility of, and problems with,
general amnesty as option in Rwanda); Morris, supra note 1, at 361 (arguing general am-
nesty is extreme solution to problems in Rwanda).
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sion. 131 There is some speculation that once trials are well under-
way, a similar organization may develop in Rwanda. 1 32 Another
more straightforward proposal is utilization of traditional arbiters
in less serious cases.
The bottom line is that there must be closure to these cases, not
only to satisfy the Rwandan people and the human rights observ-
ers in the international community, but to help the country stabi-
lize and deal with the events of the past. The next step in working
with Rwanda, therefore, should be some form of judicial adminis-
tration. The degree to which the Rwandan legal system should
conform to systems in the West is subject to endless debate. It
would be sufficient for the international community to be satisfied
that the basic tenets of due process exist in handling the serious
cases. Less contentious, but no less important, is the administra-
tion of such an overwhelming caseload. In this regard, the
Rwandans need assistance in the daily management of dockets.
The Rwandans attempted using a case triage system and failed.
They are now trying to establish another with the help of the
United Nations. In the meantime, one cannot help but think that
any advice offered will fail to recognize real limitations in both
personnel and equipment.
CONCLUSION
The ITD will return to Rwanda in the Summer of 1997 to con-
tinue working with local investigators and prosecutors. By that
time, prosecutions will be well underway and, in all likelihood, a
pattern developed. Whether that pattern will be in keeping with
the expectations of the international community remains to be
seen. What is more important, though, is that the pattern satis-
fies the Rwandan people. There is no doubt that Rwanda will
move ahead with the genocide trials as quickly as possible.
Whether the international community will continue to care, or
provide useful assistance, remains a real question.
131 See Karen Cavanaugh, Emerging South Africa: Human Rights Responses in The
Post-Apartheid Era, 5 CARDozo J. IN'L & CoMP. L. 291, 317 (1997) (explaining role of
South Africa's Truth Commission, developed to allow amnesty to political offenders for
wanton killing of civilians).
132 See Rwandan Genocide Trials, supra note 115 (noting mechanism similar to Truth
and Reconciliation Commission likely to develop in Kigali).
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